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This paper is focused not on the Internet architecture – as defined
by layering, the narrow waist of IP, and other core design principles
– but on the Internet infrastructure, as embodied in the technologies
and organizations that provide Internet service. In this paper we
discuss both the challenges and the opportunities that make this an
auspicious time to revisit how we might best structure the Internet’s
infrastructure. Currently, the tasks of transit-between-domains and
last-mile-delivery are jointly handled by a set of ISPs who intercon-
nect through BGP. In this paper we propose cleanly separating these
two tasks. For transit, we propose the creation of a “public option”
for the Internet’s core backbone. This public option core, which
complements rather than replaces the backbones used by large-scale
ISPs, would (i) run an open market for backbone bandwidth so it
could leverage links offered by third-parties, and (ii) structure its
terms-of-service to enforce network neutrality so as to encourage
competition and reduce the advantage of large incumbents.
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The structure of the current Internet infrastructure – as opposed
to its architecture – is largely an accident of history, rather than a
premeditated design. In fact, the Internet was originally a monolithic
structure, with a uniform routing protocol operating across all nodes.
As the Internet devolved into separate Autonomous Systems (each
with many internal nodes) and became commercial in the 90s, it
settled into a pattern of interconnections that, while complicated in
its details, was conceptually simple. Each stub domain connected to
the Internet through one or more Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
Interconnections between ISPs were largely bilateral and typically
fell into one of two categories – customer-provider or peering – and
the interdomain routing protocol BGP was invented to give domains
control over which paths to import and export. Because only the
largest ISPs had substantial backbones, the notion of transit became
necessary, where some ISPs carried packets that were neither from
or to hosts in their domain. As a result, the path of a typical packet
would start at the originating domain, continue through one or more
transit domains, and then arrive at the destination domain.
In these early days of the Internet, wide-area bandwidth was ex-
tremely expensive, so the backbones or cores (we will use the terms
interchangeably) – which allowed large ISPs to provide transit to
other providers – were a sign of prestige and a source of dominance.
This resulted in a small number of Tier 1 providers acting as the glue
for the Internet as a whole. The primacy of these Tier 1 providers,
and their key role in making wide-area transit possible, allowed the
Internet to flourish.
However, over the past five years, long-haul bandwidth has be-
come cheaper and easily leasable: median monthly lease prices
across a selection of critical city-pairs declined an average of 27%
and 24% (for 10Gbps and 100Gbps links, respectively), according
to [53]. Of course, long-haul bandwidth is still far more expensive
than bandwidth inside an enterprise campus or datacenter, but our
point (which we elaborate on below) is that it no longer dominates
the costs of ISPs [27].
The availability of leasable wide-area bandwidth has allowed
companies such as Cato [7] and Aryaka [2] to create their own
application-specific backbones. In fact, in the trans-Atlantic market,
content providers accounted for 85% of the international demand in
2018 [53]. Several large cloud and application providers – such as
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Google, Amazon, and Facebook – have gone further and built their
own global high-bandwidth backbones to interconnect their data-
centers and to reach various colocation facilities (such as Equinix).
Since backbone bandwidth is now readily available for lease or pur-
chase, and the expertise needed to run backbone networks has spread
beyond the global ISPs, a large fraction of Internet traffic no longer
relies on transit provided by the public Internet (see Section 2.4).
With core bandwidth becoming more plentiful, the attention of
ISPs is turning to improving and expanding last-mile connectivity.
The network edge now dominates the capital expenditures of ISPs
(e.g., see [27] for a discussion of the difference between core and
access costs) and is also where innovation and expansion are most
readily apparent.
After such sizable changes in the underlying costs and ISP priori-
ties, now is a good time to rethink how we might want to re-architect
the Internet’s infrastructure. This first requires us to examine several
problems with our current Internet infrastructure, which include out-
dated peering policies, threats to network neutrality, persistent lack
of competition (in the US market), and increasing vertical integra-
tion. Then, motivated by these problems, we propose a restructuring
of the Internet infrastructure that helps address them. Because the
problems require a rather lengthy discussion, we first give a brief
preview of our proposal.
1.2 Proposal
There are three key principles in our proposal. First, while transit
is rapidly being privatized, it is essential that the public Internet
continues to offer high-performance transit so that new content and
service providers can emerge without having to lease or construct
their own backbone. Second, the way to save public transit is to
cleanly separate it from last-mile delivery. These two functions –
transit and last-mile-delivery – are currently combined in global
ISPs, but this paper describes the advantages of splitting them. Third,
revenues should be more closely aligned with the value delivered and
cost incurred; without such alignment, the Internet will continue to
suffer from tussles [10] such as the network neutrality debate. What
we are searching for is no less than the economic architecture of the
Internet whose longevity can match that of its technical architecture.
For transit, we propose the creation of a global Public Option
for the Core (POC).1 The POC would be run by an international
nonprofit organization that initially leases bandwidth from a set of
Bandwidth Providers (BPs) and charges the users of its infrastructure
to recoup these costs. That is, while the POC is a nonprofit, it is not a
charity, so we expect it to break even financially. The nonprofit nature
is necessary to ensure that it focuses on its mission of providing
global transit, rather than moving into more lucrative markets (such
as last-mile-delivery or content and services) or avoiding poorly
served areas. The initial use of leased links allows the POC to start
without massive capital expenditures, but the POC might eventually
acquire some links of its own.
For servicing the last mile, a new generation of ISPs we call Last-
Mile-Providers (LMPs) use the POC for their transit, so they need
not build a core of their own nor use transit provided by a competing
ISP. These LMPs could be existing access-oriented ISPs or newly
1The term “Public Option” was previously used by Ma and Misra [39] to describe a
quite different approach to improving network neutrality. We describe the technical













Figure 1: Network connectivity in our proposal. The Public Option for the
Core (POC) which we describe in this paper acts as the main transit provider,
but it connects to one or more ISPs to provide connectivity to anything not
accessible through the POC. Customers – which include content and service
providers (CSPs), users, and enterprises – connect to last mile providers
(LMPs), which in turn connect to the POC. Some large CSPs also connect to
the POC directly.
created access providers; what is new is that they rely on the POC
for transit. In addition, content and service providers (CSPs) could
either directly attach to the POC (which would be the case for large
CSPs), or make use of an LMP to reach the POC.
Within our proposed design, packets would originate in one LMP
(or in a CSP), be carried by the POC directly to the destination
LMP (see Figure 1). As such, the POC is functioning as a large IXP;
the POC itself exercises no peering policies and merely acts as a
transparent fabric, leaving it to the attached LMPs to decide whether
and how to exchange traffic. This LMP-to-LMP peering decision
raises the question of whether and how to enforce network neutrality,
which is a topic we focus on later in the paper.
In terms of economics, in our proposal there is a clear delin-
eation of who pays for what. As part of this delineation, we propose
enforcing network neutrality (in a form we define later) through
contractual obligations rather than regional legislation. This arrange-
ment rewards those entities that bring value to consumers, while
enabling new entities to enter the market without unfair competition
from incumbents who, without the requirement of network neutrality,
could easily extract revenue from the value being provided by others.
This POC and the LMPs attached to it are intended to operate in
parallel with, and connected to, the current Internet infrastructure.
Nothing in this proposal forces current ISPs to change their oper-
ations, and we expect the POC to interconnect with one or more
traditional ISPs (and eventually become a Tier 1 provider itself). Our
proposal is intended to open a parallel track through which transit
can be provided (by the POC), and last-mile service established
(through LMPs). However, the full benefits of this approach will
come only when the POC becomes a large-scale provider.
We should note that there could be several coexisting (and inter-
connected) POCs, run by different entities but adopting the same
basic principles (nonprofit, focusing on transit, enforcing network
neutrality). This would allow innovation in network management
practices while providing the same basic benefits. However, for ease
of exposition, we will focus on the case where there is a single POC.
In the next section we delve into why we recommend this proposal,
and then in Section 3 describe how this can be implemented. In
Section 4 we analyze the economic implications of requiring network
neutrality, and conclude in Section 5 with a frank discussion of the
question most readers are asking themselves after reaching this point:
Are they crazy?
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1.3 Contributions
This is most definitely not a traditional SIGCOMM paper, which
typically describes a concrete design, defines quantitative perfor-
mance objectives, and then presents a thorough performance evalu-
ation. Instead, our paper is far more general, considering a radical
alternative for the Internet’s infrastructure and an analysis of its im-
pact on the overall ecosystem of ISPs and CSPs. Instead of detailed
performance results, our contributions are more subtle and fall into
three categories:
Structure: Motivated by the four troubling trends described in Sec-
tion 2, we describe a proposal for (i) cleanly separating transit and
last-mile-delivery in the Internet’s infrastructure and (ii) structuring
the flow of payments. This aligns the revenue flow with the value
flow, which reduces economic distortions and allows growth and
innovation to occur where needed. This overall structure, which we
consider a new economic architecture for the Internet, is the most
important aspect of our design. The centerpiece of this new struc-
ture is the POC, a global edge-to-edge transit network run by an
international nonprofit.
Auction: To realize this POC, we propose an auction (in Section
3) that provides a strategy-proof mechanism for compensating BPs
for their leased lines. The strategy-proof nature allows BPs to focus
on evaluating their own costs, rather than analyzing the market to
determine their bids.
Analysis of Network Neutrality: Finally, in Section 4 we discuss
network neutrality, by which we mean the prohibition of termina-
tion fees, which we define in the next section. We present a novel
economic model of CSPs and LMPs, and show how not requiring
network neutrality would hurt social welfare (in the economic sense)
and future innovation (by favoring incumbents). While our general
conclusions are in line with some others in the literature [54], we
are not aware of a similar model that captures the relevant aspects of
network neutrality so cleanly.
1.4 Ethical Considerations
This work does not raise any ethical issues.
2 Why Change?
While the easy availability of wide-area bandwidth makes our
proposal possible, it does not justify the need for major change. Here
we first outline four troubling trends (similar to those cited in the
2005 FCC report [21]) that motivate our proposal, and then describe
how the POC helps deal with them.
2.1 Peering Policies Are Outdated
The BGP policy mechanism is transitive, in the sense that a do-
main’s policy choices (about which routes to import) are limited
to the options exported by its neighbors, which are in turn limited
to the choices presented to them by their neighbors. This works
well because typical BGP policies are expressed in terms of cus-
tomer/provider/peer relationships, which are themselves transitive
(i.e., the provider of my provider acts like my provider). Moreover,
these customer/provider/peer relationships are often determined by
the amount of traffic carried (i.e., two ISPs exchanging roughly
equal amounts of traffic can peer, while those sending more than
they receive typically have to pay the other party).
While transit carries data across the Internet, the real value of
the Internet is what happens at the end points where services and
content are produced and consumed. As coined in [19], a seminal
paper on this topic, we often refer to networks where services and
content originate as content networks, and to networks where they
are consumed as eyeball networks. Traffic flows primarily from
content to eyeball networks, but the value flows both ways: eyeballs
derive value from content and services, while content and service
providers (CSPs) derive value (in terms of direct and/or advertising
revenue) from eyeballs. This value chain does not fit BGP’s transitive
nature, nor is it based on the relative rates of traffic between domains
(as some traffic has far more value-per-bit than others).
This is not merely an academic concern. For instance, the mis-
match between value flow and current peering relationships has
resulted in several disputes involving Netflix traffic. In one, Netflix
contracted with Cogent for transit because of its low prices, but then
Comcast complained when Cogent tried to transfer that data to Com-
cast’s network. Comcast was seen as violating network neutrality,
when the more relevant dynamic was a failure of modern peering
policies and their transitive nature [18].
More generally, the problem is that ISPs often combine serving
eyeballs (where value is consumed) with providing transit (where
the costs are just per-bit) and offering their own content and ser-
vices (where value is created). Even though traffic between ISPs
can be binned into different categories, there is no way the simple
transitive nature of Internet peering could possibly capture the result-
ing economic interactions (which are not, on the whole, transitive).
Violating network neutrality is one way of getting around the transi-
tive nature of interconnection; we feel that our proposal is a more
constructive step forward.
In addition, there are two other trends that are further disrupting
traditional interconnection arrangements: IXPs and CDNs. IXPs
provide interconnection points where a wide variety of networks can
directly peer with each other. As described in [5], they are gaining
in popularity among smaller ISPs, while larger ones have mostly
avoided them. CDNs have been around for decades, but with video
dominating traffic CDNs have become more important than ever (we
discuss CDNs briefly in Section 3.2).
2.2 Network Neutrality at Risk
The technical Internet community has long embraced the no-
tion that the Internet should be application-neutral; that notion later
became known as network neutrality (a term coined in [57]). In
what follows, we use both of these terms – network neutrality and
application-neutrality – with the former having more of a legal
connotation than the latter. Wikipedia [56] defines network neutral-
ity as follows: “Net neutrality is the principle that Internet service
providers treat all data on the Internet equally, and not discriminate
or charge differently by user, content, website, platform, application,
type of attached equipment, or method of communication.” A similar
definition that explicitly mentions the topic of charging comes from
[28]: “Net neutrality usually means that broadband service providers
charge consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one
content provider over another, and do not charge content providers
for sending information over broadband lines to end users.”
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Officials at several ISPs have made clear their opposition to this
last point about not charging content providers for traffic reaching
their customers. In 2005, Ed Whitacre (then CEO of SBC) said [43]
“Now what they (content providers) would like to do is use my pipes
[for] free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent
this capital and we have to have a return on it.” Similar statements
about charging content or application providers have been made
more recently by the CEOs of Telefonica, Vodafone, and Deutsche
Telekom [35, 45, 47].
The legal status of network neutrality has changed over time in
the United States. In 2005, the US’s FCC adopted network neutrality
principles and in 2015 the FCC issued the Open Internet Order that
gave them the right to enforce network neutrality. However, in 2018
these network neutrality regulations were repealed, although some
states have since instituted their own network neutrality regulations.
More globally, the European Union has strong network neutrality
regulations [4], but elsewhere regulations vary from country to coun-
try, and there is no uniform global standard.
There is a large academic economic literature on network neu-
trality, which we briefly review in Section 4. The literature comes
down on all sides of network neutrality: some explicitly in favor
(e.g., [23, 36]), some explicitly against (e.g., [20, 58]), and some
delivering a more mixed message of “it depends” (e.g., [17]). The
literature employs a set of simple models to make their case, and in
Section 4 we introduce another model that we think better captures
the relevant aspects of the situation. Our results indicate that without
network neutrality, incumbent LMPs and CSPs have a significant
competitive advantage, which would hinder innovation.
Given this result, we must answer the question of how such regu-
lations could be enforced in an infrastructure like the Internet that
transcends national boundaries. We return to this challenge later in
this section.
2.3 Competition In The ISP Market
We restrict our comments on this topic to the US market, because
the nature of ISP competition depends strongly on past and current
regulatory frameworks. Most of the developed world has far more
competition in the ISP market, largely due to loop unbundling, by
which we mean regulations requiring telecommunication operators
to allow other service providers to use (at a fair price) their last-
mile lines into homes. This means that new service providers can
enter the market without building their own last-mile infrastructure.
However, in the US ISP competition is very thin, with many areas
having only one or two viable high-bandwidth service providers.
According to figures for December 2017 [32] (also see [48]), while
over 95% of US census blocks have two or more providers supplying
at least 25mbps downloads (and at least 3mbps uploads), only 26%
of census blocks have one or more providers supplying at least
100mbps downloads (and at least 10mbps uploads), with only 5% of
census blocks having three or more such providers.
The high capital and operational costs of reaching individual
homes and businesses is one factor for why competition is so limited
for high-bandwidth network service. However, a contributing factor
is that such ISPs must either build their own core network (at signifi-
cant cost and management complexity) or contract with an ISP to
provide transit. In many cases (Cogent and Level3 are exceptions),
these transit ISPs are competing for the same last-mile market, and
can use their transit pricing to put new competitors at a disadvantage.
2.4 Vertical Integration
There are two forms of vertical integration, which we consider
separately.
2.4.1 CSPs building their own network Some of the leading
CSPs have built their own backbones (e.g., Google, Facebook, Ama-
zon, Akamai). Between CSPs that have their own backbone, and
those that host their service on one of the CSPs that have their own
backbone, it turns out that a very significant fraction of the Inter-
net’s traffic is immediately shunted into a private backbone after
leaving their home domain. For instance, the results in [8] show
that for traffic leaving GCE towards various BGP prefixes, weighted
by the volume of requests from those prefixes in their CDN trace,
roughly 66% of the requests went directly from one AS to another.
Consistent with this, we were confidentially told by an operator that
their estimate of the percentage of such direct-from-home-to-private-
backbone was roughly 70% [44]. Regardless of the exact number,
this trend is undeniable.
Geoff Huston comments on this trend in an article entitled “The
Death of Transit?” [31] (see also [9]) where he notes that most traffic
is first handled by CDN nodes at the edge, which then corral (accord-
ing to [31]) “each client into a service ‘cone’ defined by a collection
of local data centres.” Thus, there is still tremendous bandwidth
dedicated to moving bits on backbones, but much of the action has
left the public Internet and is now carried on private networks. This
runs the risk of creating several private Internet infrastructures that
essentially cater to particular sets of services, leaving the public
Internet to languish. This goes against the application-neutral spirit
of the Internet, and might (in the long run) slow innovation.
2.4.2 ISPs also providing content and/or services Various large
ISPs, such as Comcast and AT&T, are buying content providers [15].
This raises the risk of network neutrality violations, in that their
network infrastructure can favor their own services over others. Prior
work [37] has already shown that many cellular providers implement
policies favoring some content providers to the detriment of others.
If this trend is left unchecked, it could greatly impact the ability of
CSPs to reach customers in LMPs who have competing offerings.
2.5 Why the POC?
As we have described, the current Internet infrastructure has
an outdated mode of providing transit, based on transitive peering
relationships that focus on the flow of packets but ignore the flow of
value. This has caused many ISPs to contemplate charging so-called
termination fees, where remote services (such as Netflix or Google)
are charged for packets that flow into a last-mile’s provider network.
This would allow the ISPs to capture some of the value of these
services, and they feel entitled because they are providing the access
to customers.
While such termination fees are not yet implemented, there is
no federal prohibition from doing so in the US (and in many other
countries). Further, the growing trend of large ISPs entering the con-
tent and service market increases the temptation to violate network
neutrality by favoring their own services over competing ones.
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All of this is occurring in a landscape where there is little com-
petition among ISPs (at least in the US), and traffic is increasingly
funneled into private networks for transit. Thus, it seems a good time
to step back and see if there is a way to reorganize the Internet’s
infrastructure to counter these trends.
Most fundamentally, our proposal is intended to provide an eco-
nomic architecture that makes sense for the Internet. It scraps the
traditional interconnection agreements and instead has all transit
handled by the POC, with all LMPs (and CSPs) directly attached to
the POC paying for transit based on traffic sent and received. CSPs
and LMPs collect revenue directly from their customers. To enforce
network neutrality, the POC’s terms-of-service require that all at-
tached LMPs peer freely with all others, with no termination fees
and no differential service given to packets based on their source.
The POC would thus prohibit an LMP from giving their own
content better service on their own network; LMPs would be free
to acquire or develop such services as a business investment, but
they would not be able to provide them with an unfair advantage.
Similarly, the POC would not prevent large CSPs from building their
own private backbones, but the POC would ensure that all CSPs,
not just large ones, could have access to a high-performance transit
service.
All of this helps improve competition in both the LMP and CSP
markets: new entrants are not unfairly burdened by termination fees,
and all LMPs and CSPs have access to high-performance transit that
is not competing with them.
Note that loop unbundling, while definitely desirable, solves a
different set of problems than the POC. Loop unbundling allows
many LMPs to share the same last-mile infrastructure, making it easy
for new entrants to arise, but unless they build their own network core
these new entrants must contract with one or more transit carriers
who might be competing with them. Moreover, as we observe in
Section 4, the lack of network neutrality allows incumbent LMPs
to charge higher termination fees than new entrants, thereby giving
them an unfair advantage. Thus, the POC and loop unbundling are
highly complementary solutions; one eases the construction of last-
mile infrastructure, and the other ensures that new entrants need
not build their own core or contract with potentially competing
providers for transit and will not face unfair competition (via higher
termination fees) from incumbent LMPs.
2.6 Is this really new?
There are already a variety of nonprofit and governmental net-
works in operation that provide transit. For instance, in Australia,
NBN is a national governmental monopoly for wholesale Internet
and telephony transit [38]. NBN owns its links and leases them us-
ing a uniform pricing mechanism regardless of where the service is
delivered, so rural areas are cross-subsidized by metropolitan areas
[52]. The budgeting and operation of NBN is regulated by law, and
legislation also protects it from other ISPs undercutting its prices by
cherry-picking low-cost markets [51]. In addition, many of the IXPs
in Europe and elsewhere (but less so in the US) are nonprofits, and
some require open peering between all connected networks. While
these developments have some superficial similarity to our proposed
POC, and are additional evidence that nonprofit and governmental
networks can successfully carry commercial traffic, their limited
geographic scope prevents them from having any significant impact
on the broader structure of the Internet (and, to be clear, such impact
was never their intent).
More academically, the notion of a “public option” has been
previously raised in the research literature by Ma and Misra [39].
Despite the similarity of terminology, their paper addresses a very
different problem than we do. First, they do not propose any changes
to the core, only the last mile (what we call LMPs). Second, and far
more fundamentally, they focus on service differentiation between
content providers, not termination fees. They find that the presence
of a nonprofit LMP that does not discriminate creates competitive
pressure on commercial LMPs to not discriminate. However, note
that the impact of service discrimination is visible to users, who then
abandon LMPs that give worse service. In contrast, termination fees
are invisible to users, and only reduce the profit margin of CSPs.
Thus, their results would not apply to the problem we consider here.
3 Designing the Public Option for the Core
In this section we describe the overall design of the POC. We
do not describe any of the low-level technical details of running a
backbone network, as we assume that the POC uses industry best-
practices for this. Instead, we address four basic questions on four
different topics of concern:
Network Services: What network services does the POC provide?
Payment Structure: Who pays who for what?
Bandwidth Auction: How are Bandwidth Providers compensated
by the POC?
Peering: What are the peering arrangements between the LMPs that
are attached to the POC?
3.1 Network Services
At a minimum, the POC provides point-to-point connectivity
between all connected LMPs and to the external ISPs to which the
POC is connected. The POC can offer additional services; while
these are not the main point of this paper, we do want to discuss
some possible offerings. The first is offering different levels of
quality-of-service (QoS). Some definitions of network neutrality
disallow any QoS mechanisms on the basis that they could result in
the Internet serving only those who could afford good service. We
do not take a position on this debate in this paper (and therefore do
not explicitly prohibit such measures), but there is nothing in our
approach that would prevent the POC (or the attached LMPs) from
offering different qualities of service to customers. What we would
require is that these be openly offered, so that users could choose
their desired level of service and pay the resulting price. We would
not allow the POC or the attached LMPs to, on their own, decide to
favor certain traffic over others. Thus, we make a distinction between
service discrimination and QoS, and disallow the former while not
prohibiting the latter.
In addition, the POC could support multicast and anycast delivery
mechanisms, and any other standardized protocols that the IETF
adopts. More generally, the POC could offer emerging services at the
edge of its network, such as edge computing and network function
virtualization (NFV). In fact, the presence of a neutral and nonprofit
core might provide a place where such technologies – which are now
struggling because end users need a uniform approach across ISPs,
but there are no clear standards – could be tried out without worry
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about proprietary advantages for one ISP over another (and LMPs
could then offer these same technologies if they wanted).
3.2 Payment Structure
The entities we consider are the POC, a set of BPs, a set of LMPs,
a set of CSPs, and customers (businesses and people). CSPs can
either connect directly to the POC, or use an LMP to connect them-
selves to the Internet. The overall theme of the structure described
below is that entities pay directly for what they receive.
• The POC pays the BPs to lease the links needed to create a
backbone network. The POC also pays one or more ISPs for
general access, so that the POC is connected to the rest of the
Internet.
• Each LMP (and directly-attached CSP) pays the POC for net-
work access.
• Each customer pays their LMP for network access. The customer
also pays directly for any non-free CSP services they use.
• Each CSP using an LMP pays its LMP for network access.
This payment scheme is obvious, but by following the philosophy
that entities pay directly for what they receive, we avoid the situation
where ISPs turn to CSPs to pay for the bandwidth that the ISP’s
customers are consuming (which is the sentiment expressed by Ed
Whitacre). Rather, in our scheme, if a user is ingesting too much
traffic, it isn’t the CSP who should pay, but rather the user herself.
If we allowed termination fees, then each CSP might have to pay
each LMP for access to their customers. In the next section, we
consider the implications of such charges, and reject them because
they give an advantage to incumbents. We also disallow CSPs from
paying remote LMPs to get priority service for their traffic when
it arrives at the destination LMP, for the same reason; this would
give an advantage to incumbent CSPs over emerging ones. One form
of such priority service would be allowing some CSPs to pay for
the right to install their own CDNs while disallowing others to do
the same. LMPs (and the POC itself) are free to provide open CDN
services (on a fee for service basis) or allow CSPs to install their
own CDNs or similar network functions (for a set fee); what LMPs
cannot do is only allow certain LMPs to use or deploy such services.
Our decisions about who pays whom for what does not dictate
or restrict the nature of the pricing schemes (as long as they are not
discriminatory) between any pair of entities. For instance, LMPs
might charge home users a flat price, or a strictly usage-based charge,
or some form of tiered service (a flat price up to a given level of
usage). We understand that there is a tension between giving users
some predictability in costs, while also charging based on usage so
that LMPs (and the POC itself) can finance capacity expansion. Our
proposal would allow the market to evolve over time to find practical
solutions that meet both of these (and future) needs.
In addition, the question of what the POC pays BPs for their leased
lines is conceptually separate from what the POC charges LMPs for
their usage. As we describe below, the POC uses a strategyproof
auction to pay BPs, but we leave open the question of how the POC
charges LMPs. This could be, among many other options, a usage-
based price just based on the sending/receiving rate, or it could be
based on the costs incurred by where those packets flow. The only
requirement is that the sum total of revenue from the LMPs is enough
to cover the bandwidth (and other) costs of the POC.
3.3 Bandwidth Auction
Building a POC entirely out of links that it owned and oper-
ated would require a tremendous upfront expenditure of capital. We
choose instead to initially create the POC’s backbone network out
of a set of leased lines, and use the interconnections to one or more
ISPs as a fallback if the POC’s backbone does not have sufficient
connectivity. Of course, eventually the POC can transition to par-
tially owning its infrastructure, but our concern here is to find a
practical way to get started.
These leased lines can come from traditional sources, as there is
already an active market for leased bandwidth. However, we also
expect that others, such as the large CSPs that have already built their
own backbone, would be eager to provide their excess bandwidth
for lease for two reasons. First, the large CSPs have a problematic
relationship with many large ISPs, in terms of who should pay for
bandwidth. These large CSPs would like to displace the current
large ISPs with a public backbone and a more innovative set of
LMPs; the Google Fiber effort [24] is evidence of this. Offering up
leased bandwidth to the POC would foster progress in this direction.
Second, the large CSPs that are building their own backbone face
hard provisioning choices, in terms of how much bandwidth to buy at
any particular time: buy too much and they have wasted money; but
buy too little and they run the risk of congestion on their backbone.
The availability of the POC means that they can overbuy, and then
lease out (on a temporary basis) their excess bandwidth but can
quickly recall it from the POC when needed.
We think it is important that the reimbursement scheme for leased
bandwidth be completely transparent, so that no one in the ecosystem
feels that the POC is favoring certain BPs. In addition, we want to
minimize the amount of effort devoted to strategic manipulation by
the BPs (i.e., rather than trying to figure out what the market will
bear, they can just focus on what minimal price would cover their
costs). To accomplish both of these goals, we use a strategy-proof
auction mechanism for bandwidth that is a special case of the general
class of VCG auctions [11, 26, 55].
VCG auctions are widely used in many market and allocation
mechanisms. The use of VCG auction for electricity markets (in the
US and elsewhere) is probably the closest to the bandwidth auction
discussed here; see [13] for a recent survey. VCG auctions are also
commonly used in financial markets such as in the US treasury
auctions of bills and bonds, see [30].
For the POC auction, each BP (whose instances are denoted by
𝛼) offers a set of links for lease, with a specified minimal acceptable
price for each subset of these links (assume this price is the monthly
leasing charge). That is, each BP 𝛼 provides a set of links 𝐿𝛼 and a
mapping 𝐶𝛼 from the powerset 2𝐿𝛼 to a minimal acceptable price
for that subset of links (and if a subset is not offered, its price is set
to be infinite). This allows the BP to offer discounts for multiple
links, or other non-additive variations in pricing.
The external ISPs to which the POC is connected play two roles.
First, they are needed to provide connectivity to the rest of the
Internet, so packets whose destinations are not directly attached
to the POC leave the POC through one of these ISPs. Second, we
assume that these ISPs attach to the POC in multiple locations and
thus they provide virtual links between these attachment points that
go through the ISPs rather than the POC itself. We denote by 𝑉𝐿 the
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set of these virtual links, and the cost of using them is dictated by the
long-term contract between the external ISPs and the POC, not by
the auction mechanism we describe below. We denote the cost of any
subset of virtual links 𝐿𝑣 ⊆ 𝑉𝐿 to be 𝐶𝑣 (𝐿𝑣). The presence of these
virtual links 𝑉𝐿 provides the POC with a richer set of alternatives
for conveying packets between LMPs. We define 𝑂𝐿 as the set of
all offered links, both the virtual links provided by the external ISPs
and the union of the links offered by BPs: 𝑂𝐿 = 𝑉𝐿 ∪ {∪𝛼𝐿𝛼 }.
We consider the set of attachment points to include all network
locations where LMPs, directly-connected CSPs, and external ISPs
are connected to the POC. We assume that the POC has some upper-
bound estimate of its traffic matrix (how much traffic flows between
each pair of attachment points). Given the set of offered links 𝑂𝐿,
the auction mechanism picks the lowest cost subset that (i) provides
enough bandwidth to handle this traffic matrix, and (ii) obeys what-
ever other constraints the POC desires (such as requiring that it can
still handle all the traffic even under some number of link failures).
To make this more precise, given the various constraints (handling
the traffic matrix, plus any additional constraints), we map the set
𝑂𝐿 to an acceptable subset of the powerset of𝑂𝐿 that we will denote
by 𝐴(𝑂𝐿) ⊆ 2𝑂𝐿 . Each element of 𝐴(𝑂𝐿) represents a set of links
that obeys the POC’s various constraints. In what follows we assume
that none of the external ISPs are also BPs, and the set of offered
links is such that 𝐴(𝑂𝐿 − 𝐿𝛼 ) is nonempty for all 𝛼 ; that is, these
constraints can be met even if one of the BPs does not participate.
Define 𝐶 (𝐿) for some acceptable subset 𝐿 ∈ 𝐴(𝑂𝐿) as the total




𝐶𝛼 (𝐿 ∩ 𝐿𝛼 ) +𝐶𝑣 (𝐿 ∩𝑉𝐿)
The POC then picks the lowest cost member of the set 𝐴(𝑂𝐿): that
is, the set of selected links 𝑆𝐿 is given by
𝑆𝐿 = argmin𝐶 (?̃?) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ?̃? ∈ 𝐴(𝑂𝐿)
This just says that the POC selects the lowest cost solution that
obeys its constraints. The real question is how does it then pay the
BPs for their links. If the POC just pays their costs as determined by
𝐶𝛼 then each BP has an incentive to inflate their declared minimal
price. So, instead, we use a strategy-proof auction whereby BPs are
incentivized to reveal the minimal acceptable payments (via 𝐶𝛼 ),
which set the lower bound on what they will receive.
To define this mechanism, we need additional notation. For a
given BP 𝛼 define 𝑆𝐿+𝛼 = 𝑆𝐿 ∩ 𝐿𝛼 as the subset of 𝑆𝐿 that is in
the set 𝐿𝛼 ; note that with this notation, 𝐶 (𝑆𝐿) =
∑
𝛼 𝐶𝛼 (𝑆𝐿+𝛼 ) +
𝐶𝑣 (𝑆𝐿 ∩𝑉𝐿). We further define
𝑆𝐿−𝛼 = argmin𝐶 (?̃?) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ?̃? ∈ 𝐴(𝑂𝐿 − 𝐿𝛼 )
as the set of links that would be selected if BP 𝛼 did not offer any
links.
With these definitions, we can define the payoff to each normal
BP 𝛼 as:
𝑃𝛼 = 𝐶𝛼 (𝑆𝐿+𝛼 ) + (𝐶 (𝑆𝐿−𝛼 ) −𝐶 (𝑆𝐿))
This VCG mechanism (which is essentially the Clarke pivot rule
[42]) selects the lowest cost options, and obeys the constraint that
the payoffs are no less than the value𝐶𝛼 (𝑆𝐿+𝛼 ). This lower bound is
obeyed because the cost cannot go down if you reduce the number of
links available, so𝐶 (𝑆𝐿−𝛼 ) ≥ 𝐶 (𝑆𝐿). The strategyproofness follows
from the fact that the values in this expression do not depend on any











Figure 2: We show the payment-over-bid margins (PoB) for the five largest
BPs (ordered in decreasing size).
of the prices set by 𝛼 (i.e., the value of𝐶𝛼 (𝑆𝐿+𝛼 ) in the first and last
terms cancel out).
While VCG mechanisms have been applied to routing before,
our application here is more general. For instance, the approach
in [22] applied VCG mechanisms to a simplified form of routing
where all links were strategically independent (they were actually
BGP domains) and only lowest cost routing is used without capacity
constraints or resilience considerations. Here, we allow very general
route computations that can take these factors into account.
Like all VCG mechanisms, this auction is vulnerable to collusion,
but the presence of the connections to external ISPs sets an upper
bound on the costs of alternate paths, so any of the manipulations
mentioned below can only have limited impact. If the BPs can guess
in advance what the set 𝑆𝐿 is, they can decide to not offer any
links not in this set without changing their own payoff, but possibly
changing that of others. For instance, removing links 𝐿𝛽 − 𝑆𝐿 from
OL cannot make 𝐶 (𝑆𝐿−𝛼 ) smaller, and can make it substantially
bigger, thereby increasing the payoff to BP 𝛼 . At the same time,
doing so does not change 𝑆𝐿 nor 𝑃𝛽 , so BP 𝛽 is unhurt by doing so.
If all the BPs do this, they could potentially all gain (even without
side payments). However, doing so requires them to know 𝑆𝐿 in
advance (because if they withdraw links in 𝑆𝐿 they can hurt their
own payoffs).
To illustrate how this auction might work in practice, we took
network data from TopologyZoo [33], filtered out some of the small
networks, combined some networks to form 20 BPs, and then placed
POC routers at points where there were four or more BPs closely
colocated. The resulting POC network has 4674 point-to-point con-
nections between POC routers; we call these connections logical
links because they may involve several physical links. The BPs vary
in size, contributing from roughly 2% to roughly 12% of the logi-
cal links in the POC. We then generated a synthetic traffic matrix
between all POC routers, and ran our auction with three different
constraints (always looking for the cheapest solution that satisfies
each constraint). Constraint #1 only requires that the set of links
can handle the offered load. Constraint #2 requires that it could
do so assuming that any single path between a pair of routers has
failed. Constraint #3 requires that it do so assuming that a path be-
tween each pair of routers has failed. For each of these scenarios,
we computed 𝐶𝛼 and 𝑃𝛼 , and in Figure 2 we show the resulting
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payment-over-bid margins (PoB), 𝑃𝑜𝐵 = 𝑃𝛼−𝐶𝛼
𝐶𝛼
, of the five largest
BPs. One aspect to note is the high variation in the PoB, which is a
good reason for the POC to use an open algorithm so that it cannot
be accused of favoritism.
3.4 Peering Arrangements
We now focus on the POC and the attached LMPs, asking whether
and how they exchange traffic, and ignore the rest of the Internet for
the moment. The nature of peering relationships among the attached
LMPs, and specifically whether network neutrality would dictate an
answer, depends greatly on how the POC fits into the overall Internet
ecosystem. In particular, is it considered an ISP, or an IXP?
If one thinks of the POC as a large ISP (with all those connecting
to it being customers in the traditional provider-peer-customer cate-
gorization) then network neutrality requires that each LMP accepts
whatever traffic arrives from the POC, not discriminating based on
the original source of packets. Moreover, network neutrality requires
that there be no termination fee for packets arriving from one of the
other LMPs, because there is no direct peering relationship between
the LMPs. In short, if the POC is seen as an ISP, and network neu-
trality continues to hold, then LMPs treat all arriving packets equally.
The only payments are from the LMPs to the POC for providing
core network service.
If one thinks of the POC as a global IXP – that is, essentially
a policy-free interconnection infrastructure that allows all LMPs
to peer (or not) with each other directly – then each LMP must
decide with which other LMPs to peer (and exchange traffic), and
whether any fees should be paid in doing so. One might think that
enabling direct peering between all POC-connected LMPs would
help foster network neutrality, because there are no intermediate
transit ISPs to discriminate against traffic, but the opposite is true!
Network neutrality has never constrained an individual domain’s
choice of peering: if peering is direct, discrimination based on the
nature of the connecting LMP is easy to implement and does not
violate network neutrality. For instance, if Netflix directly attaches
to the POC (and acts as an LMP), and we consider the POC to
be an IXP, then all other LMPs would be free (even under network
neutrality regulations) to refuse to peer with Netflix without payment
for doing so; in short, they could demand that Netflix pay them to be
their “provider” in the traditional sense of customer/provider peering
arrangements, and refuse to interconnect if Netflix refused to pay.
However, such a decision to not interconnect would be harmful,
because it would disconnect pairs of LMPs, which would lead to
fragmentation of the Internet. In today’s Internet, each customer
(whether enterprise, home, or CSP) is responsible for finding some
ISP who will connect them to the rest of the Internet; there are many
available ISPs that offer this service, so one relies on the market to
provide acceptable solutions. However, for LMPs directly connected
to the POC and only connected to the POC, the POC is the only way
to interconnect with other LMPs, so there is no other choice.
Whether one considers this a network neutrality question or a
peering question, the criteria for making this choice should be to
choose the option that is best for the long-term health of the Internet.
We consider this question in great detail in the next section by
analyzing a formal model for these peering decisions, and come to
the conclusion that it is best that LMPs be required to peer without
termination fees with all other LMPs.
One might argue that this is unfair to LMPs that must carry
traffic to their customers from bandwidth-heavy video services, with-
out compensation from those video services. However, we are not
proposing that LMPs cannot be compensated for the service they
provide, we merely require that they obtain their compensation from
their directly-paying customers rather from the LMPs they peer with.
A key point in our design is that there is no need for compensation
at a distance, except between CSPs and users (where the interaction
occurs at the application-level). The LMP customers of the POC are
paying for all traffic carried from and to them by the POC. Similarly,
the customers of each LMP are paying for all traffic carried from
and to them by that LMP.
If one of the endpoints on the POC is a CSP like Netflix, then
the customers pay this service directly, which can cover Netflix’s
payments to its LMP (or to the POC if it is connected directly)
for the bandwidth it uses. And the customers of Netflix are also
paying their LMPs for the bandwidth they receive from Netflix.
Thus, in our proposed arrangement, every LMP or CSP who is
incurring large bandwidth costs recoups those costs directly from
their customers (who are the ultimate cause of that traffic), rather
than expecting non-customers to help defray those costs. By having
the bandwidth costs collected by the parties causing them (the CSP
and the end user), and payments for the service made directly to the
CSP by the customers, this leads to a natural splitting of the revenues
between LMPs and CSPs in a way that is driven by customer’s
willingness to pay and the presence of competitive alternatives, rather
than through painful negotiations filled with brinkmanship as in the
Netflix-Cogent-Comcast case.
However, this does require that users pay for their bandwidth
usage. Historically, imposing bandwidth limits and usage-based
charging has resulted in significantly bad press for the ISPs propos-
ing such measures. However, we think the economics on this are
clear; it is better to have costs borne by the entities that caused those
costs. We should also note that whatever you think of our proposal,
termination fees are not the right way of dealing with this problem.
Allowing LMPs to impose termination fees is a mechanism that can
improve LMP profits, but in no way guarantees that this additional
revenue was needed to expand capacity or that the LMPs will indeed
spend it on expanding capacity. As we will see in the next section,
when termination fees are allowed, the LMP can extract revenue
from CSPs independent of whether it is needed to cover bandwidth
costs.
Before continuing, we make the peering conditions precise, with
the caveat that exceptions should be made for security concerns
(which may require blocking) or internal maintenance traffic (which
may require priority or other special handling). The peering condi-
tions we impose are that a POC-connected LMP must not: (i) dif-
ferentially (in terms of priorities or blocking) treat incoming traffic
based on the source or application, nor differentially treat outgoing
traffic based on the destination or application; or (ii) differentially
provide CDN or other application-enhancement services based on
the source (for incoming packets) or destination (for outgoing pack-
ets); or (iii) differentially allow third-parties to provide CDN or other
application-enhancement services that only target a subset of traffic
(where this last condition prevents an LMP from allowing, say, Net-
flix to install services that enhance their traffic but disallowing others
from installing such services). These conditions also apply to traffic
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arising within the LMP providing content or services to customers.
Also, note that the LMP can offer application-enhancement services
or QoS for a given price, and only provide those services to those
who pay; what they cannot do is arbitrarily discriminate between
traffic.
These are included in the terms-of-service. If widespread cheating
is anticipated, the POC could only forward encrypted traffic making
in harder for LMPs to discriminate, but this would require a software
change by users, which is unlikely.
4 The Case for Network Neutrality
4.1 Preliminaries
The peering policy presented in Section 3.4 is a crucial aspect
of our proposal. To make this fundamental decision, we had to first
consider three preliminary questions:
By what criteria do we make this fundamental decision? Here
we take an economic perspective and focus on two goals: maximizing
social welfare and fostering competition. Social welfare is the total
utility (which for us will be the sum of utilities over all users); it
ignores payments made by users because payments merely transfer
some of that utility to others, and social welfare does not measure
how utility is distributed within society, it merely measures the total.
To be clear, we also care about the distribution but, as we will note
later, if we succeed in fostering competition then the distributional
issues will work themselves out.
As for fostering competition, we want an environment where the
large incumbents do not have unfair advantages over new entrants in
the market (where the operational definition of unfair will become
clear later in this section). Fair competition is what allows new and
innovative CSPs and LMPs to gain a foothold in the market, which
in turn (because of their innovation which hopefully leads to better
services that create more user utility) can lead to increases in future
social welfare. So in some sense our goals are both about social
welfare; one focuses on the current social welfare and the other on
the future social welfare.
How do we model the economic interactions? To determine which
peering policies would best achieve our goals, we must analyze a
simple model that attempts to capture the relevant economic interac-
tions. For issues as complicated as commercial transactions in the
Internet ecosystem, any model we consider will be oversimplified.
Choosing a good model is more art than science, in that the model
must be both tractable (so we can derive results) and representative
(yielding results that are suggestive of what would happen in the real
world). The former is easy to characterize, but the latter is a matter
of judgement.
What peering policies do we consider? We obviously cannot con-
sider all possible policies that could guide how LMPs interact. For
instance, one LMP might provide different levels of service (i.e.,
QoS) to traffic from various other LMPs, or enter into joint mar-
keting agreements, or collude to raise prices in a geographic area.
Here, we restrict ourselves to two possible forms of peering: (1)
freely peering, where every LMP accepts incoming traffic from all
other LMPs and CSPs without any termination fees and (2) for-fee
peering, where LMPs can charge termination fees to CSPs, or block
their traffic if they refuse to pay. In both cases, we assume no traffic
discrimination (by which we mean prioritization based on source,
rather than different QoS levels which are charged differently inde-
pendent of source). Thus, we want to consider two scenarios, one
where network neutrality (NN) is contractually enforced by the POC,
and an unregulated (UR) scenario where LMPs are free to impose
termination fees and block traffic if they are not paid. While this
may be limiting, it does yield conclusions that intuitively (but not
quantitatively) apply to traffic discrimination in that imposing poor
QoS on incoming traffic reduces the value of that traffic to users, so
it can be seen as a form of termination fee.
4.2 Our Model
We consider a model that only contains the POC and the LMPs
and CSPs directly connected to it. For ease of exposition we assume
all LMPs are eyeball networks (this does not alter our analysis); the
directly attached CSPs sell services to the users of the LMPs. We
assume that the CSPs have no marginal costs for adding customers
(as these are online services, and the costs are small enough to
ignore in our simple model). In the NN scenario, the LMPs freely
accept traffic from all CSPs. In the UR scenario, they can impose a
termination fee 𝑡 on a CSP or block its traffic.
There is a complicated competitive process between LMPs, who
face high capital costs to enter the market, and lower marginal costs;
these conditions are a recipe for natural monopolies, but even so
some competition survives. Rather than model this directly, which
would necessarily fall short of reality, we merely assume that the
competition between LMPs results in one or more LMPs for each
region, and that customers have chosen a single LMP for their con-
nectivity. We assume this choice changes slowly, so that in the
short term each LMP is the monopoly connectivity provider for
its customers. Thus, while LMPs may coexist in a region, and the
competition between them involves many different factors (cost
structure, bandwidth, SLAs, etc.), we assume that this competition
results (over the short term) in a static partitioning of customers
among LMPs.
Similarly, there is a complicated market for content and services
on the Internet, with all the products competing for user attention
and with many products serving as partial substitutes for others.
Again, instead of modeling this competition directly, which would
be impossible to do with any accuracy, we merely consider a set
of independent goods which are not substitutes for each other. This
is unrealistic, but gives the best case for termination fees (i.e., it
minimizes their harm): if the CSP market is fully competitive, then
LMPs have all the market power (and can set the termination fees
to maximize their own revenue, which we model in Section 4.4),
whereas if the goods are not competitive the market power of the
LMPs is limited so, as we describe in Section 4.5, the setting of
the termination fees can be modeled as a negotiation. In addition,
we assume that each CSP charges a uniform price for their service
independent of a user’s LMP, and that the distribution of demand for
a CSP is the same for customers of each LMP.
To express this model mathematically, we consider a mass of
consumers, most conveniently described as a unit mass on the unit
interval. Each consumer has a choice among a variety of CSPs,
𝑠 = 1, ..., 𝑆 . The value that a specific consumer attaches to service 𝑠 is
given by 𝑣𝑠 , also called its “willingness to pay”. The demand for each
CSP is determined by the cumulative distribution of these values
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in the population, denoted by 𝐹𝑠 (𝑣𝑠 ), which quantifies the fraction
of consumers with willingness to pay less than 𝑣𝑠 . We assume that
𝐹𝑠 (𝑣𝑠 ) also describes the distribution of demands of the customer
populations in each LMP.
Any consumer who has a value 𝑣𝑠 weakly larger than the posted
price 𝑝𝑠 will buy that CSP’s service. The demand 𝐷𝑠 at price 𝑝𝑠 for
the service 𝑠 is therefore
𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 1 − 𝐹𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) ,
which is monotone decreasing in the price 𝑝𝑠 .
Similarly, there are a variety of LMPs, 𝑙 = 1, ..., 𝐿. Each consumer
only has a single LMP. Each LMP 𝑙 charges a price 𝑐𝑙 to their
customers. In what follows, we ignore any welfare derived from
merely having connectivity, and only focus on welfare arising from
the CSPs.
4.3 Network Neutrality
We begin our analysis by assuming that we are in the network
neutrality (NN) regime where no termination fees are allowed. Being
connected to the network, each consumer can choose to purchase
as many of the CSP services as she deems valuable. Since we have
assumed the CSP products are not substitutes for each other, each




In the NN regime, this is the end of the story: LMPs have their
customers, CSPs set their prices to maximize revenue, and there are
no complications. The resulting social welfare (the sum over user





Note that the social welfare is monotonically decreasing in the
prices 𝑝∗𝑠 ; every increase in price 𝑝𝑠 potentially causes some con-
sumers to not purchase the service 𝑠.
4.4 LMPs unilaterally set fees
We now turn to the unregulated (UR) scenario where termination
fees are allowed. We consider two possible ways these fees can be
set: unilaterally (in this subsection) and through bargaining (in the
next subsection).
We have assumed that, in the short term, each LMP is a monopoly
provider for its users. One way of modeling these fees is to assume
that each LMP can unilaterally set the fees for each CSP to reach its
customers (since, in the short term, there is no other way of reaching
them). This fee-setting behavior of the LMP results in the so-called
“double marginalization” process [49]. Charged a fee 𝑡𝑠 per customer,
CSP 𝑠 chooses a revenue-maximizing price 𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ). Given that the
revenue per customer is now 𝑝𝑠 − 𝑡𝑠 , the revenue-maximizing price
is given by:
𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) = argmax
𝑝𝑠
{(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑡𝑠 )𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 )} (1)
Note that with sufficient smoothness and convexity conditions, the
maximizing price 𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) can be shown to be strictly increasing in 𝑡𝑠 .
LEMMA 1. If 𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) is strictly positive with continuous first and
second derivatives, is strictly decreasing (𝐷 ′𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) < 0), is strictly
convex (𝐷 ′′𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) > 0), and asymptotically vanishes (lim𝑝𝑠→∞ 𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) =
0), then 𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) is monotonically increasing in 𝑡𝑠 : 𝑝 ′𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) > 0.
Proof: Since 𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) maximizes (𝑝𝑠 −𝑡𝑠 )𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) it must satisfy the
equations (i) 𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) > 𝑡𝑠 , (ii) 𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 )) + (𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) − 𝑡𝑠 )𝐷 ′(𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 )) =
0, and (iii) 2𝐷 ′𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 )) + (𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) − 𝑡𝑠 )𝐷 ′′(𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 )) ≤ 0. Taking the
derivative of equation (ii) and rearranging yields
𝑝 ′𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) [2𝐷 ′(𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 )) + (𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) − 𝑡𝑠 )𝐷 ′′𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ))] = 𝐷 ′𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ))
Equation (iii) tells us that the left hand bracket is negative, and we
know the right hand side is negative, so 𝑝 ′𝑠 (𝑡𝑠 ) must be positive.
Thus, as the termination fees 𝑡𝑠 increase, the prices 𝑝𝑠 increase,
so the social welfare decreases. We can therefore conclude that
termination fees strictly decrease social welfare.
Returning to the unilateral scenario, knowing how CSP 𝑠 will set









Of course, each LMP independently chooses the fee that they
charge, but they all do the same calculation (for each CSP), so the
result is uniform termination fees 𝑡𝑠 across all LMPs. This process
is referred to as “double marginalization” because the CSP and then
the LMP are maximizing revenue in sequence.
4.5 Bilateral Bargaining
Modeling the LMP as imposing fees unilaterally on every content
provider neglects the fact that both the LMP and the CSP may
have some degree of bargaining power. The LMP can ask for a
termination fee 𝑡𝑠 or else they will block the CSP. The CSP can
threaten to walk away from the deal, leaving the LMP’s customers
without the services offered by that CSP. This situation is similar
to many other bilateral monopolies where a bilateral bargaining
approach has provided sharp insights; for example, cable providers
bargain with content providers over how much they pay to show a
particular channel (e.g., Comcast and ESPN have to negotiate the
fees that Comcast pays to ESPN, see [14]). Another situation is the
negotiation between health insurers and local hospitals, where the
insurance company acts as a gatekeeper between hospital and patient,
see [29]. In such settings, two parties negotiate and eventually arrive
at an agreement.
Rather than explicitly modelling the entire extensive form of the
game that represents the complex strategic environment involved
in such negotiations, the economic analysis has typically adopted
a cooperative solution concept that satisfies a number of axiomatic
requirements. We shall follow this approach here and adopt the Nash
bargaining solution (NBS) [41]. This cooperative solution concept
can be given non-cooperative and fully strategic foundations, as
established by [46]. More relevant for our purposes here, the Nash
bargaining solution can be fully extended to bargaining environments
with many participants and externalities across environment and
agreements, as established recently in [12]. For the present purpose,
it will suffice to restrict attention to the bilateral bargaining solution.
The NBS can be defined as follows. There are two agents with
utility functions 𝑢 and 𝑣 , and a feasible set of outcomes 𝐹 and a dis-
agreement point 𝑑 that represents the outcome when the players do
not come to agreement. Then the NBS outcome is the outcome that
maximizes the product of the utility differences between agreement




{(𝑢 (𝑥) − 𝑢 (𝑑)) (𝑣 (𝑥) − 𝑣 (𝑑))} .
We consider a series of three models using NBS, with increasing
levels of complexity. First, we consider a single CSP 𝑠 and a single
LMP 𝑙 who are bargaining over the termination fee. Since this is
a bilateral negotiation, it does not affect the fees 𝑡𝑠 being charged
by other LMPs, so we assume that CSP 𝑠 keeps its price 𝑝𝑠 fixed
regardless of the outcome of this negotiation (recall that we assume
CSPs charge global prices that do not depend on the LMP of the
user). In what follows, we focus only on the revenue per customer
in LMP 𝑙 . If they come to agreement on a fee 𝑡𝑠 , then 𝑠 obtains
𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑡𝑠 ) and 𝑙 obtains 𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 )𝑡𝑠 . If they disagree, then 𝑠 gets
no revenue from customers of 𝑙 , and 𝑙 loses some fraction 𝑟𝑠
𝑙
of
customers who used to also be customers of 𝑠 (those who were never
customers of 𝑠 are presumably unaffected by the fact that 𝑠 is no
longer offered on 𝑙’s network), and recall that these customers were
paying an access charge 𝑐𝑙 to the LMP. The loss 𝑠 suffers at the
disagreement point is 𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑡𝑠 )) and the loss suffered by 𝑙 is
𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) (𝑡𝑠 + 𝑟𝑠𝑙 𝑐𝑙 ).
Thus, the quantity the NBS maximizes is:
[𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑡𝑠 )] [𝐷𝑠 (𝑝𝑠 ) (𝑡𝑠 + 𝑟𝑠𝑙 𝑐𝑙 )]
Taking the derivative with respect to 𝑡𝑠 of this expression and setting
the result to zero shows that the transfer payment that maximizes the
product of the gains from agreement is:
𝑡𝑠 =
𝑝𝑠 − 𝑟𝑠𝑙 𝑐𝑙
2
,
We therefore take this as the negotiated fee 𝑡𝑠 . Note that the fee is de-
creasing in the rate 𝑟𝑠
𝑙
at which customers leave 𝑙 when negotiations
with service 𝑠 break down. Moreover, the fee can be negative (𝑙 pays
𝑠) when the loss suffered at the disagreement point by 𝑙 is greater
than the loss suffered by 𝑠. However, in what follows we assume we
are in the regime where the termination fees are positive.
The key parameter here is 𝑟𝑠
𝑙
, which is the rate at which the LMP
𝑙 loses customers when 𝑠 is no longer offered on its network. For
a given 𝑠, 𝑟𝑠
𝑙
will presumably be smaller if 𝑙 is a well-established
incumbent than if it is a newly established LMP with a smaller
market share. This means that well-established LMPs can extract
more in termination fees than smaller ones, giving them a substantial
competitive advantage.
Similarly, for a given 𝑙 , 𝑟𝑠
𝑙
will presumably be larger if 𝑠 is a
well-established CSP than if it is a newly established one. This again
gives a significant competitive advantage to CSPs with large market
share, because they can pay less in termination fees.
While the exact values of 𝑟𝑠
𝑙
and the specific nature of the demand
curves 𝐷𝑠 are empirical matters that will determine the quantitative
impact of allowing termination fees, it is clear that such fees will
systematically favor established incumbents in both the LMP and
CSP markets.
The above model focused only on one bilateral negotiation, but
all the LMPs will want to extract what they can from each CSP. In
our second model applying the bargaining approach, we account for
the presence of these other fees. We find that the weighted average
fee 𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠 (normalized by number of customers 𝑛
𝑠
𝑙
of 𝑠 in each LMP 𝑙)
charged to service 𝑠 is given by:
𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠 =
𝑝𝑠− < 𝑟𝑐 >𝑠
2
.











is the average of 𝑟𝑠
𝑙
𝑐𝑙 over all 𝑙 weighted
by population. Thus, our previous result about bilateral negotiation
applies even when all LMPs are charging fees.
In our third and final model based on bargaining, we note that
when faced with a set of termination fees from all LMPs, each
CSP 𝑠 will modify its price 𝑝𝑠 so as to maximize revenue given
these fees. This revenue-maximizing price is given by 𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠 ) in
Equation 1. After changing the price 𝑝𝑠 the termination fees 𝑡𝑠 will
be renegotiated, and so on. Based on our earlier analysis of NBS, we
eventually reach an equilibrium where the following equation holds:
𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠 =
𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠 )− < 𝑟𝑐 >𝑠
2
.
The core result here is that when we allow termination fees, the
prices 𝑝𝑠 increase with the imposed fees, which then decreases social
welfare. While the price increase (due to termination fees) faced by
the consumer will likely be less under bilateral bargaining than under
unilateral fee setting, it will still result in a lower social welfare
than the NN case. More importantly, incumbent CSPs and ISPs
will have a significant competitive advantage over emerging ones:
incumbent ISPs can negotiate higher termination fees than emerging
ones, and incumbent CSPs can negotiate smaller termination fees
than emerging ones. This is the reason we strongly favor the network
neutrality regime over the unregulated scenario.
These conclusions are intuitive, but we are not aware of a result
in the literature that derives them cleanly from such a simple model.
4.6 Related Literature on Network Neutrality
While the past two decades has seen an active debate about net
neutrality, the economics literature on net neutrality is still in de-
velopment, see [25, 34] for quick introductions and [3, 16, 54] for
further reading. In particular, we lack a solid empirical understanding
of the key economic trade-offs being made by LMPs and CSPs, so
most of the theoretical investigations involve simple models similar
to what we have just presented.
The network neutrality literature is too broad and varied to give a
complete review of it here, so instead we review the aspects where
our treatment differs from major portions of the general literature.
We start by describing ways in which our general approach differs,
and then describe some more technical differences.
Our first significant difference from a major portion of the net-
work neutrality literature is that we focus on maximizing social
welfare, whereas optimizing consumer welfare is sometimes used in
arguments for network neutrality [34]. Social welfare is (in our set-
ting) the total utility users derive from network services, ignoring the
payments they have made for those services (since those payments
just increase the utility of others), while consumer welfare takes
those payments into account because it focuses on the net welfare
(utility minus payments) of the users.
Thus, we are ignoring the distribution of that welfare (between
users and CSPs and LMPs). We do this because we view innovation
as the most important way to grow social welfare in the long-term,
and enabling a more competitive market does that. As a byproduct,
vigorous competition in the LMP and CSP market tends to drive
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most of the value into consumer welfare (since payments decrease).
Thus, while NN has both higher social welfare and fairer competition
than UR, we view the latter as more important than the former.
Our second important difference is that many works on network
neutrality focus on service differentiation, whereas we only consider
termination fees. We view termination fees as the most fundamental
violation of network neutrality, whereas (as mentioned earlier) of-
fering different qualities of service, if done on an open basis with
posted prices, is a very different matter which we do not address
(and take no stand against).
In addition, there are concerns that ex ante network neutrality
regulation (i.e., regulations imposed before significant violations
occur) might interfere with the Internet’s evolution [20]. Because
we do not take a hard stance against QoS, we are not limiting future
design choices, only specific revenue mechanisms. Moreover, once
termination fees start being imposed it will be hard to claw them
back, so ex ante regulation seems to be exactly what is called for.
Also, it has sometimes been argued that the last mile provider
needs to share (via termination fees) in the profits of the content
provider to maintain adequate bandwidth. But this argument neglects
two important points. First, such termination fees can be applied
even in the absence of bandwidth needs, so the solution (termination
fees) seems ill-suited to solve this particular problem (incentives for
bandwidth expansion). Second, the last mile provider can, even in
the presence of network neutrality, charge its consumer for the traffic
volume. See [40] for recent work that establishes how better adapted
pricing policies by the last mile providers can substantially improve
the usage of broadband networks.
At a more detailed level, two significant ways we differ from the
existing literature is that (i) we do not model CSP-CSP or ISP-ISP
competition at all (as opposed to, for example, [6]); and (ii) we
model the CSP-ISP interaction as a Nash bargaining problem rather
than as a non-cooperative game with a Nash equilibrium (which
is the dominant approach in the literature). The former decision is
because Nash equilibria of toy models of the CSP and ISP markets
often depend on small details in the modeling, and thus are not
sufficiently representative; moreover, we don’t see such competition
as changing the essence of our results here (though it may change the
values of the parameters 𝑟𝑠
𝑙
). For the latter decision about modeling
CSP-ISP interactions via NBS, the closest paper to ours in this spirit
is [1] but in that work the bargaining power was given exogenously,
where here it was derived from the nature of the disagreement point.
5 Are We Crazy?
We end by considering two questions.
Is major change needed? The problems we are addressing all stem
from a single cause: the Internet was not designed with a business
model in mind. The peering practices that emerged from the early
days of the commercial Internet were never able to produce revenue
flows that were tightly tied to the way value is delivered and cost is
incurred in the modern Internet. The resulting debate about network
neutrality was doomed to intellectual failure, because it operated
within a model where value and revenue would always be somewhat
disconnected. We approached this problem more fundamentally by
asking how could we redesign the infrastructure so that the value
and revenue chains could be cleanly aligned.
The motivation for our approach is quite simple. Today’s large
ISPs combine the tasks of transit and last-mile-delivery, and often
play the role of both CSP and ISP. There is no way the Internet’s
current transitive method of passing on traffic and recouping cost
could possible encompass this kind of complexity. Our alternative is
to cleanly separate transit and last-mile-delivery, and then have the
LMPs and CSPs turn directly to their own customers to recoup costs
and extract revenue from the value delivered.
We are proposing this as the fundamental economic architecture
of the Internet, one that we think can continue to apply even under
massive changes in the services provided, the content shared, and
the resulting costs incurred.
Is such a change possible? We first note that while the POC is
radically different from the status quo, it is incrementally deployable.
We are not engaging in clean-slate fantasies here, but instead hoping
that a radically different way of structuring the Internet could start
off almost as a demonstration project, and then grow over time into a
true alternative that competes with the current Internet infrastructure.
If more and more LMPs find the POC attractive (and the success of
IXPs in Europe suggest that this is not farfetched) then over time the
POC can have a substantial impact on the Internet.
But does the POC have a chance of becoming real? From a straight
business perspective, it is a dubious proposition, since it would
take years to gain the confidence of LMPs, who would be risking
their own financial future on the fate of the POC. However, there
is another strong force at work here, one that is captured in the
phrase “Commoditize Your Complement”. This is a strategy first
identified by Joel Spolsky [50] that we now briefly explain. In today’s
technology marketplace, delivering value to consumers typically
requires several different products to work together: for instance,
displaying a movie on a phone requires the mobile device itself,
the cellular infrastructure, the Internet infrastructure, and the movie
service. All these products are complements of each other. Spolsky’s
insight [50] was simple: “Demand for a product increases when
the prices of its complements decrease.” Simply put, a consumer is
willing to pay a certain amount to watch movies on her phone; as
the other components of this process become cheaper the remaining
components can charge more.
Currently the ISPs and the CSPs are complements of each other
in a hugely lucrative business, and the network neutrality debates
are nothing more than an argument about how to share the proceeds.
The POC would be a way for the CSPs to commoditize the ISP
market, by explicitly turning transit into a nonprofit and creating a
competitive market in LMPs. As such, the success of the POC would
be extremely valuable to the large CSPs. They could easily provide
the initial set of leased links, along with some guarantees for the
POC’s longevity, which would supply the much-needed credibility.
While this does not answer the question about our sanity, we hope
it provides some hope for the Internet’s future stability.
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